Security Dilemma in South Asia: Building Arsenals and Living with Distrust



MON, 04/20/2015 - 4:00PM TO 5:00PM
Spring 2015 Colloquium Series

*Please note that this talk will not be recorded*

India and Pakistan are engaged in a subtle strategic competition and a gradual arms race where technological innovations, military modernizations, and growing nuclear arsenals are raising the stakes for stability. India’s military investment is driven by a strategic rivalry with China, but the pace of development finds Pakistan increasingly vulnerable to exploitation; to reduce the level of disparity, Pakistan turns to China, and though willing and able to bolster Pakistan’s strategic capability, the assistance is not enough to enable Pakistan to meet multiple conventional force contingencies. Islamabad therefore depends even more on nuclear weapons to offset its force imbalance with India. In this classic security dilemma, where competition is intensifying and mutual distrust is swelling, the potential for an outbreak of military crisis in South Asia is increasing. The situation demands a structured peace and security architecture to initiate détente and ensure stability between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. Without such an agreement, the consequences of an unchecked India-Pakistan security competition could reverberate beyond South Asia into the Asia- Pacific and Middle East regions.

About the Speaker:

Feroz Hassan Khan is on the faculty of Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California where he is professor of security studies and international relations in the Department of National Security Affairs at the where he teaches He is a former Brigadier in the Pakistan Army, with experience in combat action and command on active fronts on the Line of Control in Kashmir and Siachin Glacier and Afghanistan border. He has served on numerous assignments in the United States, Europe, and Asia. He last served as Director Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, in the Strategic Plans Division, Joint Services Headquarters. Khan had been a key contributor in formulating Pakistan’s security policies on nuclear and conventional arms control and strategic stability in South Asia. He produced recommendations for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and represented Pakistan in several multilateral and bilateral arms control negotiations.

Brigadier Khan holds an M.A. International Relations from the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), John Hopkins University, Washington DC. He has held a series of visiting fellowships at Stanford University, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; the Brookings Institution; Center for Non-Proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and at the Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratory. He also taught courses as a visiting faculty at the Department of the Defense and Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.

He has widely participated in international and national conferences on strategic issues, international security, terrorism, nuclear arms control and non-proliferation issues. He is the author of Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2012)